PANEL 18 / NON-IDEAL PUZZLES OF LEGITIMACY: STATES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
CONVENORS: ALI EMRE BENLI (University of Vienna), ANTONIETTE SCHERZ (Stockholm University) and ANTONY TAYLOR (Fribourg University).
All enquiries about the panel should be sent to [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected].
This panel examines three puzzles of legitimacy surrounding states and international institutions in less than ideal contexts.
In the first talk, Imposing Economic Sanctions, Anthony Taylor takes up the question: When and why economic sanctions might be morally permissible? After critically evaluating James Pattison’s pragmatic view and Cécile Fabre’s cosmopolitan view, Taylor offers his own account based on the authority of international legal institutions. He argues that international legal institutions can shape the moral landscape by recognizing the legitimacy of a state: When international institutions confer recognitional legitimacy onto a state, they grant it certain rights against interference, including qualified protections against economic coercion. This view can explain why some unjust states retain rights against the imposition of sanctions—their status grants them a protected sphere within which to exercise political authority.
In the second talk, Refugees, Climate Emergency and State System Legitimacy, Ali Emre Benli asks: Is it legitimate for states to suspend their obligations towards refugees in order to avoid the harms of climate catastrophe? Benli first concedes that, in the context of climate emergency, some criteria for states to attain legitimacy might be relaxed. Following Ross Mittiga, it might be legitimate for states to suspend some of their commitments to democratic or individual rights in order to guarantee the safety and security of its citizens. Nevertheless, based on recent theorizing on state system legitimacy, Benli argues that, in order to sustain their legitimacy, states that aim to secure the safety and security of its citizens ought to secure similar guarantees for refugees.
In the third talk, Resisting (Il)legitimate International Institutions, Antoinette Scherz and Attila Mraz inquire when resistance to illegitimate international institutions is justified? To this end, Scherz and Mraz consider three challenges to the application of the ethics of resistance to injustice to acts of principled resistance against international institutions. First, while domestic resistance is often justified with reference to the aim of restoring democratic institutions, international institutions are widely held to be legitimate even if not democratic. Second, some international institutions have overwhelmingly content-dependent (rather than content-independent) criteria of legitimacy. Third, individuals are typically not directly subject to the authority of international institutions. In responding to these challenges, Scherz and Mraz outline a theory of justified resistance against illegitimate international institutions.
All enquiries about the panel should be sent to [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected].
This panel examines three puzzles of legitimacy surrounding states and international institutions in less than ideal contexts.
In the first talk, Imposing Economic Sanctions, Anthony Taylor takes up the question: When and why economic sanctions might be morally permissible? After critically evaluating James Pattison’s pragmatic view and Cécile Fabre’s cosmopolitan view, Taylor offers his own account based on the authority of international legal institutions. He argues that international legal institutions can shape the moral landscape by recognizing the legitimacy of a state: When international institutions confer recognitional legitimacy onto a state, they grant it certain rights against interference, including qualified protections against economic coercion. This view can explain why some unjust states retain rights against the imposition of sanctions—their status grants them a protected sphere within which to exercise political authority.
In the second talk, Refugees, Climate Emergency and State System Legitimacy, Ali Emre Benli asks: Is it legitimate for states to suspend their obligations towards refugees in order to avoid the harms of climate catastrophe? Benli first concedes that, in the context of climate emergency, some criteria for states to attain legitimacy might be relaxed. Following Ross Mittiga, it might be legitimate for states to suspend some of their commitments to democratic or individual rights in order to guarantee the safety and security of its citizens. Nevertheless, based on recent theorizing on state system legitimacy, Benli argues that, in order to sustain their legitimacy, states that aim to secure the safety and security of its citizens ought to secure similar guarantees for refugees.
In the third talk, Resisting (Il)legitimate International Institutions, Antoinette Scherz and Attila Mraz inquire when resistance to illegitimate international institutions is justified? To this end, Scherz and Mraz consider three challenges to the application of the ethics of resistance to injustice to acts of principled resistance against international institutions. First, while domestic resistance is often justified with reference to the aim of restoring democratic institutions, international institutions are widely held to be legitimate even if not democratic. Second, some international institutions have overwhelmingly content-dependent (rather than content-independent) criteria of legitimacy. Third, individuals are typically not directly subject to the authority of international institutions. In responding to these challenges, Scherz and Mraz outline a theory of justified resistance against illegitimate international institutions.
